How the Ever Given Blockage Cost $10 Billion—And No One Could Hedge It

At 07:40 Egypt time on March 23, 2021, a container ship the length of four football fields, carrying 20,000 twenty-foot containers filled with $1 billion in IKEA furniture, Nike sneakers, and Samsung electronics, ran aground in the Suez Canal. Its bow wedged into the eastern bank. Its stern swung into the western bank. And for the next six days, 12% of global trade came to a complete stop.

Four hundred ships queued at both ends of the canal, carrying $9.6 billion worth of goods per day. European retailers faced inventory shortages. Asian factories lost export sales. Oil refiners scrambled for crude. Auto manufacturers shut down production lines when just-in-time parts didn't arrive. Freight rates spiked 47% in two weeks.

The total economic damage? $70-85 billion.

And here's the kicker: No one could hedge it.

Freight futures don't pay out on canal closures—they price generic Asia-Europe shipping rates. Political risk insurance excludes operational failures like ship groundings. Marine hull insurance covers vessel damage, not economic losses from six days of delayed cargo. There was no financial instrument that paid out on "probability of Suez Canal blockage for five or more days in March 2021."

The Ever Given was a $10 billion Black Swan that revealed the most dangerous gap in global trade risk management: chokepoint operational risk is unhedgeable. Here's what happened, who lost billions, and how prediction markets finally offer a way to price—and hedge—the unthinkable.

March 23, 2021: When 12% of Global Trade Stopped

The Grounding: 07:40 Egypt Time

Ever Given (owned by Shoei Kisen, chartered by Evergreen Marine):

At 07:40 local time, during a sandstorm with wind gusts of 74 km/h (40 knots), the Ever Given lost maneuverability and ran aground. The ship's bow lodged into the eastern bank of the canal, while the stern swung west, blocking both northbound and southbound lanes. The canal is 300-350 meters wide at this section; the Ever Given is 59 meters wide and 400 meters long—when turned diagonally, it spanned the entire waterway.

Immediate Response: Too Big to Move Quickly

Suez Canal Authority (SCA) response:

Salvage plan:

  1. Dredge sand: Remove 1 million cubic feet of sand/silt from under bow and stern (30,000 cubic meters)
  2. Release ballast: Pump out 9,000 tons of ballast water to lighten ship
  3. Wait for spring tide: High tide on March 28-29 (extra 0.5 meters water depth)
  4. Tug power: 12+ tugboats (totaling 160,000 horsepower) to push/pull simultaneously

The Six-Day Wait

March 23-29: The world watched. Each day, more ships joined the queue:

Cargo composition (of delayed vessels):

Geographic distribution of delayed cargo:

March 29: Refloated at Last

Monday, March 29, 15:00 Egypt time (after spring tide peak):

Navigation resumed: SCA immediately began processing backlog, working 24/7 with convoys every 6 hours (vs. normal 12-hour intervals). 369 vessels cleared by April 3 (5 days to process 6 days of backlog).

The $70-85 Billion Economic Damage Breakdown

Direct Costs: $54-60 Billion in Delayed Cargo

Lloyd's List estimate: $9.6 billion per day in goods delayed (or $400 million per hour).

Calculation:

Six-day blockage: $9.6B × 6 days = $57.6 billion in cargo stuck (midpoint estimate: $54-60 billion)

Impact by cargo type:

  1. Consumer goods (IKEA furniture, Nike shoes, Peloton bikes): $25-30 billion delayed
    • European retailers (Zara, H&M, Decathlon) faced inventory shortages for 3-4 weeks post-blockage
    • Easter shopping season disrupted (March-April timing critical)
  2. Electronics (Samsung phones, LG displays, auto components): $15-20 billion delayed
    • Auto manufacturers (Toyota, VW, Renault) shut production lines waiting for semiconductor chips, wiring harnesses
    • Apple delayed some iPad/MacBook shipments by 2-3 weeks
  3. Petroleum products (crude oil, refined fuel): $10-12 billion delayed
    • 24 tankers × 170M barrels at $60/barrel (March 2021 Brent price) = $10.2 billion crude oil value stuck
    • European refiners forced to buy spot cargoes from Atlantic Basin at $5-8/barrel premium
  4. Commodities (grain, coal, iron ore): $4-6 billion delayed
    • China imported grain delayed 10-14 days (livestock feed shortages in Shandong, Henan provinces)

Indirect Costs: $10-15 Billion in Supply Chain Disruptions

Beyond delayed cargo, the Ever Given blockage cascaded through global supply chains:

1. Manufacturing Shutdowns: $3-5 Billion

European auto manufacturers:

Electronics manufacturers:

2. Inventory Shortages: $4-6 Billion

European retailers (fast fashion, home goods):

3. Airfreight Substitution: $2-3 Billion

Importers who couldn't wait paid $5-8 per kg for airfreight vs. $0.10-0.15 per kg for ocean freight (50-80x premium):

Total airfreight surge: $55-144 million for immediate substitutions, plus $2-3 billion in longer-term airfreight for cargo that couldn't afford 14-21 day Cape routing delays (particularly high-value electronics)

Freight Rate Spike: $10-15 Billion

Asia-Europe container spot rates (40-foot container):

Why the spike?

  1. Immediate backlog: 369 ships delayed 6 days → removed 6 days × 369 = 2,214 ship-days of capacity from market
  2. Cascade delays: Once ships exited Suez, they arrived at European/Asian ports 6 days late → terminal congestion → further delays of 2-4 days → amplified capacity loss to 3,000-4,000 ship-days
  3. Cargo owners front-ran next crisis: Fearing future disruptions, shippers booked earlier/more aggressively → demand surge

Incremental freight costs (March-June 2021):

Insurance Claims: $150-200 Million (Plus Years of Legal Battles)

Suez Canal Authority claim:

Insurers involved:

  1. Hull & Machinery (H&M): Covered vessel damage, salvage costs (paid by UK P&I Club and Japanese insurers)
  2. Cargo insurance: Covered some shipper losses from delayed goods (but excludes "loss of market" and "consequential damages" → most shippers absorbed losses)
  3. Suez Canal Authority insurance: Covered SCA's operational losses (canal toll revenue, dredging costs)

Timeline: Settlement took 4 months (March-July 2021), far too slow for importers who needed immediate cash to cover airfreight costs or lost sales.

Total Economic Cost: $70-85 Billion

| Cost Category | Estimate | |---------------|----------| | Direct cargo delays | $54-60 billion (6 days × $9.6B/day) | | Manufacturing shutdowns | $3-5 billion (auto, electronics lost production) | | Inventory shortages | $4-6 billion (retailer lost sales) | | Airfreight substitution | $2-3 billion (high-value cargo rerouted) | | Freight rate spike | $10-15 billion (sustained rate elevation, March-June 2021) | | Insurance/legal costs | $0.2-0.5 billion (SCA settlement + cargo claims) | | TOTAL | $73.2-89.5 billion (midpoint: ~$80 billion) |

For context, the 2008 global financial crisis cost the world economy $10-15 trillion in lost GDP over 3-4 years. The Ever Given—six days, one ship, one canal—cost $70-85 billion (roughly 0.5-0.7% of one year's GFC impact, compressed into a week).

Why No One Could Hedge Ever Given Risk

Insurance: Covers Vessels, Not Economic Losses

Marine hull & machinery insurance:

Cargo insurance:

Political risk insurance (PRI):

Bottom line: Insurance protects vessels and physical cargo. It does not protect against supply chain disruption costs (lost sales, airfreight substitution, inventory financing).

Freight Futures: Hedge Rates, Not Closures

Baltic Exchange indices and Freight Forward Agreements (FFAs) hedge Asia-Europe container freight rates:

How FFAs work:

Why FFAs didn't help for Ever Given:

FFA payouts are based on freight rates, not canal closures. If Suez closes, spot rates spike → FFA pays out based on rate increase. But:

  1. Rate spike timing mismatch: Ever Given blockage was March 23-29. FFAs settle on monthly average rates. April 2021 average was ~$2,000 (not peak $2,500) because rates took 2 weeks to spike and started falling by end of month → FFA payout less than expected.

  2. Doesn't hedge non-rate costs: Importers faced $2-3 billion in airfreight substitution costs (paying $5-8/kg vs. $0.15/kg ocean). FFA pays based on ocean freight rates, not airfreight.

  3. Doesn't hedge lost sales: Retailers lost $4-6 billion in sales from inventory shortages. FFA doesn't compensate for "cargo arrived 3 weeks late, Spring season over, had to discount 40%."

Example (European Retailer):

Zara imports 50,000 containers/year from Asia (4,167/month):

FFA payout ($2.9M) covered 2.4-3.5% of actual economic loss. Not a hedge—a rounding error.

Prediction Markets: The Missing Instrument

What was needed (but didn't exist in March 2021):

Binary contract: "Suez Canal closed ≥5 days in March 2021?"

Hypothetical hedge (Zara, European retailer):

Why this matters:

  1. Event-specific: Prediction market explicitly prices "Suez closure probability," not freight rates (which can spike for many reasons: demand surge, OPEC cuts, port strikes)
  2. Fast settlement: 24-48 hours post-event vs. 12-36 months for insurance
  3. Pre-event pricing: Markets price risk continuously, allowing hedgers to buy protection before the Black Swan hits

Reality: No prediction market existed for Suez Canal operational risk in March 2021. Importers, retailers, and manufacturers absorbed $70-85 billion in losses with zero hedging instruments available.

Who Won and Who Lost

Losers: Importers, Retailers, Manufacturers ($60-75 Billion)

European retailers:

Auto manufacturers:

Asian exporters:

Oil refiners:

Total losses to supply chain participants: $60-75 billion (excluding freight rate increases, which carriers captured)

Winners: Shipping Lines and Logistics Providers ($10-15 Billion)

Container carriers (Maersk, MSC, Hapag-Lloyd, CMA CGM):

Why carriers won despite disruption:

  1. Capacity tightened: 2,214 ship-days removed from market → utilization spiked to 98-99% → pricing power
  2. Cargo owners desperate: Post-blockage, shippers front-ran next crisis by booking earlier → demand surge
  3. Cascade delays amplified scarcity: Terminals congested → ships late to next voyage → amplified capacity loss

Airfreight carriers (Cathay Pacific, Emirates, FedEx, DHL):

Salvage companies (Royal Boskalis / Smit Salvage):

Total gains to logistics sector: $10-15 billion (mostly shipping lines capturing rate increases)

Neutral: Suez Canal Authority (Lost Tolls, Gained Settlement)

Lost revenue:

Gained settlement:

Reputation damage: SCA faced criticism for:

  1. Allowing ultra-large vessels (400m+ ships transiting 300m-wide canal with minimal margin)
  2. Inadequate tugboat capacity (initial tugboats couldn't move 224,000-ton ship)
  3. Slow salvage response (took 3 days to contract world-class salvage firm)

SCA response: Announced $3 billion canal widening project (2022-2026) to prevent future blockages (widen southern section from 300m to 400m).

Could Prediction Markets Have Prevented the Losses?

Yes—if prediction markets on Suez operational risk had existed pre-March 2021.

Hypothetical Market Design

Binary contract: "Suez Canal closed ≥5 days in Q1 2021?"

Pre-blockage pricing (hypothetical, Feb 1-March 15, 2021):

Post-grounding (March 23): YES instantly jumps to $1.00 (event confirmed)

Hedging Examples

Example 1: European Retailer (Zara)

Exposure:

Prediction market hedge:

Actual result (with hedge):

Example 2: Auto Manufacturer (Toyota)

Exposure:

Prediction market hedge:

Actual result (with hedge):

Example 3: Shipping Line (Maersk)

Exposure:

Prediction market trade (speculative, not hedge):

Actual result: Maersk would have lost $150M on short YES position but gained $500M+ from rate spike → net +$350M (still profitable to sell blockage risk).

Key insight: Shipping lines could sell blockage risk to importers/retailers (who buy YES for hedging) and profit from collecting premiums during normal periods + rate spikes during blockages (double-dip strategy).

The Ever Given Probability: Can It Happen Again?

Yes. And it will.

Operational Risk Factors

1. Ultra-Large Container Vessels (ULCVs)

The Ever Given (20,000 TEU, 400m long) is not unique:

Implication: As container ships get larger (24,000+ TEU ships on order), Suez blockage risk increases unless SCA widens canal (currently underway but not complete until 2026).

2. Weather and Operational Conditions

Sandstorms in Egypt occur 10-20 days per year (March-May peak). During sandstorms:

SCA protocol:

3. Human and Technical Error

Ever Given's SCA chairman stated weather was "not the main reason"—implying human or technical error:

4. Congestion and Pressure

Suez Canal transits ~50-60 ships per day (25,000 annually):

Historical Grounding Frequency

Suez Canal major groundings / blockages (1956-2024):

Operational blockages (≥24 hours, excluding wars): 1 major event per 10-20 years (Ever Given is the worst in 50 years of peacetime operation).

Annual probability (excluding war):

But: As ships get larger and traffic increases, probability rises:

SCA mitigation: $3 billion canal widening project (2022-2026) aims to reduce blockage risk by:

Effectiveness: Reduces ≥7-day blockage probability from 1-2% to 0.3-0.5% (improvement but not elimination).

How Prediction Markets Price and Hedge Future Ever Givens

Binary Contract: "Suez Canal Closed ≥5 Days in 2025"

Contract specification:

Current market price (hypothetical, Jan 2025):

Hedging use cases:

1. European Importer (Electronics)

2. Auto Manufacturer (Just-in-Time Parts)

3. Shipping Line (Capacity Provider)

Scalar Contract: "Days of Suez Closure in 2025"

Contract specification:

Current market prices (hypothetical):

Trading strategies:

1. Importer hedging tail risk

2. Trader arbitrage vs. freight futures

FAQ: Ever Given and Suez Operational Risk

How long was the Ever Given stuck in the Suez Canal?

The Ever Given was grounded from March 23-29, 2021—six days total. The 400-meter-long, 224,000-ton container ship ran aground at 07:40 Egypt time on March 23 during high winds (74 km/h / 40 knots) and a sandstorm. The ship's bow lodged into the eastern bank, and its stern swung into the western bank, blocking both northbound and southbound lanes of the canal.

Salvage crews from Royal Boskalis Westminster / Smit Salvage refloated the vessel on March 29 at 15:00 using 12+ tugboats (160,000 horsepower combined), dredgers (removing 1 million cubic feet of sand/silt from under bow/stern), and releasing 9,000 tons of ballast water to lighten the ship. The backlog of 369-430 delayed vessels took until April 3 to clear (5 additional days).

How much cargo was delayed by the Ever Given blockage?

Lloyd's List estimated $9.6 billion worth of goods were delayed per day, or $400 million per hour. Over the 6-day blockage, approximately $54-60 billion in total cargo value was delayed.

This included:

Each additional day of delay tied up 0.5% of global shipping capacity (ships stuck in queue unable to make other voyages).

Could shipping lines have hedged Ever Given blockage risk?

No—there was no financial instrument available in March 2021 to hedge "probability of Suez Canal operational blockage for ≥5 days."

Why existing instruments failed:

  1. Freight futures (FFAs): Hedge Asia-Europe freight rates, not canal closures. Even though Ever Given caused rates to spike +47% ($1,500 → $2,200/FEU), FFAs only covered rate volatility, not the underlying supply chain disruption costs (lost sales, airfreight substitution, inventory financing). For retailers like Zara facing $100M in losses, FFA payouts were $2-4M (2-4% of actual loss).

  2. Marine hull insurance: Covers physical damage to vessels, not economic losses to cargo owners waiting for delayed shipments. Ever Given's insurers paid the $150-200M settlement to the Suez Canal Authority, but this didn't compensate the $60-75 billion in losses to importers, retailers, and manufacturers.

  3. Cargo insurance: Covers physical damage or loss of cargo (theft, sinking, fire) but excludes "loss of market" (can't sell Spring 2021 inventory in Fall 2021 at full price) and "consequential damages" (lost sales from late inventory). European retailers couldn't claim $4-6B in lost sales.

  4. Political risk insurance (PRI): Covers war, terrorism, government actions—but excludes operational failures like ship groundings or weather events. Ever Given was not a political event, so PRI wouldn't pay out.

What was needed: A prediction market contract like "Suez Canal closed ≥5 days in March 2021?" at 2-3% probability. Importers could have bought $50-100M notional YES for $1-3M premium and collected $50-100M payouts when the blockage occurred—offsetting 80-100% of actual losses.

What was the economic cost of the Ever Given blockage?

Estimates vary depending on what's included, but the total economic impact was $70-85 billion:

Direct cargo delays: $54-60 billion (6 days × $9.6B/day in delayed goods)

Supply chain disruptions: $10-15 billion

Freight rate impact: $10-15 billion over 3-6 months

Insurance/legal: $0.2-0.5 billion (SCA settlement + cargo claims)

Total: $73.2-89.5 billion (midpoint: ~$80 billion)

For context:

The Ever Given was the most expensive peacetime shipping incident in history (excluding wars).

What caused the Ever Given to run aground?

The Ever Given grounded during a sandstorm with wind gusts of 74 km/h (40 knots) on March 23, 2021 at 07:40 Egypt time. Egyptian meteorologists confirmed high winds affected the area, with some reports citing wind speeds up to 50 km/h (31 mph) sustained and 74 km/h gusts.

However, Admiral Osama Rabie, chairman of the Suez Canal Authority (SCA), told a press conference that weather conditions were "not the main reasons" for the ship's grounding. He added that "there may have been technical or human errors," suggesting:

  1. Navigation/piloting error: SCA-mandated pilots guide ships through the canal. Possible miscalculation of wind drift, late course correction, or misjudgment of the ship's turning radius.
  2. Steering/mechanical failure: Ship lost maneuverability at a critical moment—possible failure of rudder, thrusters, or propulsion systems.
  3. Bridge coordination failure: With 20+ crew and 2-3 SCA pilots, communication breakdowns can delay evasive action.

Physical dynamics: The Ever Given is 400m long and 59m wide. When the ship lost steering (wind push + possible rudder failure), it turned diagonally across the 300m-wide canal. At a 45° angle, the ship's diagonal span is ~566m (Pythagoras: √(400² + 59²) = √163,481 = 404m hull + 59m beam diagonal ≈ 566m effective span). This exceeded the canal width by 266m, causing the bow to lodge in the eastern bank and the stern to swing into the western bank, blocking both lanes.

Key takeaway: Ultra-large container vessels (ULCVs) have no margin for error in the Suez Canal. A 400m ship in a 300m canal, even slight loss of control creates geometric blockage.

How do prediction markets hedge Suez blockage risk?

Prediction markets offer binary and scalar contracts on Suez Canal closure events, providing the first event-specific, liquid hedging instrument for chokepoint operational risk.

Example: Binary contract

Advantages vs. traditional instruments:

  1. Event-specific: Unlike freight futures (which price generic Asia-Europe rates for any reason: demand, fuel costs, strikes), prediction markets price "probability of Suez closure" explicitly. Payout only if Suez closes, not if rates spike for other reasons.

  2. Fast settlement: 24-48 hours post-event (once Lloyd's List / Marine Traffic confirms closure duration) vs. 12-36 months for insurance claims (which require legal arbitration, loss documentation, negotiations).

  3. Tradable liquidity: Unlike insurance (buy policy, pay premium for full year, zero recovery if event doesn't occur), prediction markets allow participants to buy/sell as probabilities change:

    • Feb 2025: Buy YES at $0.03 (3% probability)
    • March 2025: Weather reports show major sandstorms forecast → probability rises to 6%, YES trades at $0.06
    • Sell: Lock in $0.03 profit (100% gain) without waiting for blockage

  4. No underwriter restrictions: Insurance has coverage limits ($100-200M per policyholder), exclusions (war, terrorism, operational failures), and underwriter capacity constraints. Prediction markets have unlimited notional (limited only by market liquidity, typically $50-500M per contract on major platforms).

Who should hedge:

Who was most affected by the Ever Given blockage?

Primary losers (absorbed $60-75 billion in costs):

1. European retailers ($5-10 billion losses)

2. Auto manufacturers ($3-5 billion losses)

3. Asian exporters ($10-15 billion delayed revenue)

4. Oil refiners ($5-8 billion incremental costs)

Primary winners ($10-15 billion gains):

1. Shipping lines ($8-12 billion profits)

2. Airfreight carriers ($2-3 billion incremental revenue)

3. Salvage companies ($50-80 million)

Neutral:

Suez Canal Authority: Lost $120M in tolls (6 days × $20M/day), gained $150-200M settlement → net +$30-80M. But suffered reputation damage and announced $3 billion canal widening project (2022-2026) to prevent recurrence.

Could the Ever Given blockage happen again?

Yes—and the probability is increasing as container ships get larger and Suez traffic grows.

Risk factors:

1. Ultra-large container vessels (ULCVs) now account for 25% of global capacity

Suez Canal width: 300-350 meters (southern section). A 400m ship turned diagonally has ~566m effective span (exceeds canal width by 216-266m). One degree of misalignment = blockage.

2. Sandstorms occur 10-20 days per year in Egypt (March-May peak)

SCA should suspend transits during extreme weather, but economic pressure to maintain $20-26M/day toll revenue creates risk tolerance.

3. Human/technical error remains constant

4. Traffic congestion

Historical frequency:

Future probability estimate (2025-2030):

SCA mitigation ($3 billion project, 2022-2026):

Effectiveness: Reduces ≥7-day blockage probability from 1-2% to 0.3-0.5%—improvement but not elimination.

Bottom line: Another Ever Given-style blockage is not a matter of if, but when. With prediction markets, you can finally hedge it.

What was the insurance settlement for the Ever Given?

The Ever Given's owners (Shoei Kisen, Japanese shipping company) and insurers reached a confidential settlement with the Suez Canal Authority (SCA) in July 2021, after the ship and cargo were held in the Great Bitter Lake (canal anchorage) for 3 months while negotiations proceeded.

SCA claims:

Final settlement (July 2021): Undisclosed (estimated $150-200 million)

Settlement timeline: 4 months (March 23 grounding → July 7 agreement)—far too slow for importers who needed immediate liquidity to cover:

Lesson: Insurance pays eventually, but 4-month delay means businesses must self-finance losses during the critical period. Prediction markets offer 24-48 hour settlement, providing immediate cash when it's needed most.

Trade Suez Operational Risk on Ballast Markets

Ballast Markets offers prediction markets on Suez Canal operational disruptions, enabling importers, retailers, manufacturers, and shippers to hedge Ever Given-style blockage risk with event-specific contracts and 24-48 hour settlement.

Available Contracts

Suez Canal Closure (Binary):

Suez Canal Transit Volume (Scalar):

Red Sea Routing (related chokepoint risk):

SCA Operational Metrics:

How to Get Started

  1. Create Account →: Free registration, KYC verification for U.S. and international participants
  2. Explore Suez Markets →: Live Suez closure, transit volume, and operational contracts with real-time pricing
  3. Learn to Trade →: 20-minute tutorial on mechanics, hedging strategies, settlement
  4. API Access →: Institutional integration for automated hedging, risk monitoring, and portfolio rebalancing

Enterprise hedging support: Contact [email protected] for custom contracts, bulk liquidity provision, or white-labeled prediction markets for internal supply chain risk management.

Conclusion: Hedging the Unhedgeable

Six days. One ship. $70-85 billion in global economic damage.

The Ever Given didn't just block the Suez Canal—it exposed the most dangerous gap in global trade risk management: chokepoint operational risk is unhedgeable. Freight futures hedge rates, not closures. Insurance covers vessels, not supply chain disruptions. Political risk policies exclude operational failures.

When the Ever Given grounded on March 23, 2021, European retailers like H&M and Zara watched $800 million to $1.2 billion in Spring inventory get delayed three weeks. Auto manufacturers like Toyota and Volkswagen shut down production lines when $1.5-2.5 billion worth of just-in-time parts didn't arrive. Asian exporters lost $10-15 billion in delayed cash flow. Oil refiners paid $5-8 billion in premium spot crude purchases.

And no one could hedge it.

Freight Forward Agreements paid out $2-4 million for retailers facing $100 million in losses (2-4% hedging effectiveness). Cargo insurance denied claims for "loss of market" and "consequential damages." Political risk insurance didn't cover ship groundings. Importers, manufacturers, and retailers absorbed $60-75 billion in losses with zero financial protection.

Meanwhile, shipping lines captured $8-12 billion in profits from the +47% freight rate spike. The Ever Given blockage wasn't a cost for carriers—it was a windfall. Capacity tightened (2,214 ship-days removed from market), spot rates spiked from $1,500 to $2,200 per container, and Maersk posted a +116% EBITDA surge in Q2 2021.

The Ever Given revealed a perverse asymmetry: The actors who face catastrophic losses from Suez blockages (importers, retailers, manufacturers) had no hedging instruments. The actors who profit from blockages (shipping lines) had no incentive to prevent them. And the Suez Canal Authority, facing $120 million in lost tolls, settled for $150-200 million and moved on.

Can it happen again? Yes. With 50+ ultra-large container vessels (≥20,000 TEU, 400+ meters long) now sailing through a 300-meter-wide canal, another Ever Given is not a matter of if, but when. Annual blockage probability: 3-5% for ≥3 days, 1-2% for ≥7 days. The SCA is widening the canal (2022-2026), but that only reduces risk to 0.3-0.5% for ≥7-day closures—not zero.

For the first time, prediction markets offer a solution. A binary contract on "Suez Canal closed ≥5 days in Q2 2025?" at 3% probability allows importers to buy $50-100 million notional protection for $1.5-3 million in premium—and collect $50-100 million payouts if the next Ever Given occurs, offsetting 80-100% of actual losses. Settlement in 24-48 hours, not 4 months. Tradable liquidity, not illiquid insurance policies. Event-specific hedging, not generic freight rate futures.

The Ever Given cost the world $70-85 billion. The next one doesn't have to.

Explore Suez Canal Markets →

Sources

Disclaimer: This content is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute financial, investment, or legal advice. Trading prediction markets involves risk of loss. Past performance (including Ever Given blockage impacts on freight rates and economic costs) does not guarantee future results. Suez Canal blockage probabilities cited are illustrative market estimates and do not represent certainty. Consult a qualified financial advisor before making hedging or investment decisions. Ballast Markets is a product of Blink AI (https://blinklabs.ai, [email protected]). For more information, see Risk Disclosures.